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Abstract 
A semiotic theory of systems derived from language would have the purpose of classifying  all the 
systems of linguistic expression: philosophy, ideology, myth, poetry, art, as much as the dream,  lapsus,  
and free association in a pluridimensional matrix that will interact with many diversified fields.  In each 
one of these discourses it is necessary to consider a plurality of questions, the essence of which will  only 
be comprehensible by the totality; it will be necessary to ask, in the first place, what will be the  purpose 
of this language, what function does it fulfill and for which reason has it been constructed. The concept of 
world vision is introduced and its relation with Generalized Collective Conscience and  Particularized 
Collective Conscience. Culture implies a particular World vision. Culture creates  Generalized Collective 
Conscience. The semantic field is a structure that formalizes the units of a certain  culture constituting a 
portion of the vision of the Reality that owns this culture. An ecological case is explained.  
Keywords Circumstance, Code, Connotation, Culture, Semantic field, World vision 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Reality contains interpretable evidence, and the mental ways of communication and 
their extension, represented in the devices constructed by social man need to be 
understood. Language is an origin of the systemic conception of Reality. It is possible to 
define language as a symbolic substitute of Reality, or as a system of signs. Different 
classes of objects exist, and are characterized by different mental acts through which we 
distinguish them from their surroundings (Meinong, 1904). Objects of sensorial 
perception are different from objects of thought, but these latter ones are not less 
"objective" than the previous ones:  they are apprehended by thought but not constituted 
by thought. According to the terminology of Meinong, meaning subsists, whereas the 
individual beings and the qualities exist.  In this sense, objects of thought can be real 
without existing in the technical sense defined by Meinong.  Mathematical objects are 
of this class.  The first condition is (Agazzi, 1992) that these objects are there, and they 
are not made through an act of discourse, but through the presence of these objects in 
the Subject’s thought.  From a phenomenological viewpoint we may say that an object, 
simply by the fact of being present, offers the Subject an irrefutable witness of itself.  
The referential situation is the phenomenological presence of the object.  And the truth 
of a sentence is the coincidence between the situation and its phenomenological 
presence. It is important to notice that meanings or understandings are only partially 
faithful with respect to any particular phenomenological presence or referential situation 
that they could denote. Some form of modalization (aletical, deontical or doxical) 
necessarily accompanies the communication. A great epistemological separation exists 
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between thought and language. All organization of language depends on a complex 
structure.  A bi-univocal correspondence between the perception of Reality and the 
linguistic system is unthinkable.  The subject operates from a superior order, from a 
mesosystem that would include them and in which both appear like elements and not 
like closed and independent units. Horizontal forces on any system are those that 
determine their significance.  This means that no language is neutral. And that no space 
of representation is neutral either.  That is to say, the systemic conception, like any 
other semiotic conception, represents Reality in the same way as other nonsystemic 
conceptions.   
Beings do not have an intrinsic meaning and they only transform themselves into signs 
when we have invested them with meaning. The signs are significant units that take 
their form from words, images, sounds, gestures and objects, studied within a system of 
semiotic signs, like meanings or code.  In any process, we can distinguish between 
having a significant as an inherent property, and having significance when it is related 
to other processes of Reality that the Subject considers as a system. The existence of 
information is independent of the fact that there is a Subject able to decode the message, 
which it is intended to communicate. This objective information is termed significant. 
The information in a message acquires meaning if a Subject decodes the message. This 
subjective information is termed significance. (Sastre-Vazquez, P.. Usó-Doménech, 
J.L., Y. Villacampa, J. Mateu and P. Salvador. 1999; Usó-Domènech, J.L., G. Stübing, 
J. López-Vila, and P. Sastre Vázquez, 2002; Usó-Domènech, J.L., J. Mateu. 2004; 
Villacampa, Y., Usó-Domènech, J.L Mateu, J. Vives, F. and Sastre, P. 1999; 
Villacampa-Esteve, Y., Usó-Domènech, J.L., Castro-Lopez-M, A. and P. Sastre-
Vazquez, . 1999; Usó-Domènech, J.L. and Villacampa, Y., 2001).  
Both distinctions involve the use of learned codes. The significance tends to emerge 
from an individual sign, until it is equipped with many meanings that go beyond what 
the sign says originally . Different orders of meaning or levels of significance exist:   
1) The first order of significance is precisely the one of denotation, at which level 
there exists a sign t consisting of significant and significance.  
2) The connotation is a significance of the second order that uses the denotative 
sign (with significant and significance) as significant, with an additional 
associate significance.   
The significance of a linguistic sign also depends on the code where it is located, since 
the codes give a scheme, compounded also by belief conventions, within which the 
linguistic sign acquires sense. This allows interpretation such as text interpretation 
(systems), each one of these being organized in agreement with codes and subcodes 
reflecting values, attitudes, beliefs, assumptions and practices.  This implies a certain 
stability in the relations between significant and significance, restricting the amount of 
possible interpretations.  This distinction considers the connotation as a sign that is 
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derived from the significant of a denotative sign, so that the denotation takes us to a 
chain of connotations.  Denotation is an underlying and primary significance.   
 
The significant S or significance s depends entirely on the level in which the analysis 
operates. Then, what is significance in one level of the context,  can be significant in 
another one.  
The subject receives two types of semiotic stimuli:  
a) The significant of the person’s own processes or being.  
b) The significant of the transmitted semiotic stimulus or the significant of the 
significance (connotation).   
The significant coming from the sign becomes significance after passing through a filter 
or sieve, which we will denominate doxical filter. This filter consists of two essential 
components:  language and the belief system.   
Any conception of Reality, after passing through the doxical filter is a model, formal or 
not. The construction of such a model has inherently a language (formal or not) and the 
corresponding linguistic aspects such as the syntax and semantic components are 
something implicit. Due to the fact that grammar is a theory for a language and that 
every elaboration of a theory must include as its main objective ease and generality, it is 
natural to formulate a theory of linguistic structure which allows the most revealing 
general statements to take place (Chomsky, 1962). 
 
2. LANGUAGE AND WORLD VISION (WV) 
Conflict between two groups, including war, may be defined as a battle between belief 
systems. Symbols emerge strongly in such conflicts: they may be revered objects as 
stones, writings, buildings, flags or badges; whatever they may be, they may symbolize 
the central core of the belief system. When people become symbols, the real person may 
become obscured behind the projected symbolic image or person.  
Organizations develop their own in-house culture and belief systems, too, which leads 
them to act and behave in ways that might not seem entirely rational to an outsider. 
Societies and their associate phenomena, such as culture, language, literature, ethics, 
laws, economics, etc., can more adequately be understood and studied if they are 
regarded as systems. This be because networks of relations for any set of assumed 
observables allow examination of the ways the various socio-semiotic aggregates 
operate.  
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Definition 1: By World Vision (WV) we understand a way to think, to hope, to project, 
to fear, to calculate, etc., of a human group, obligatory collective, immersed in a society 
characterized by a certain culture and in a determined historical period (Ferreras, 
1980).  
 
a) WV never is conceived, crystallized; their presences exist because they mediate 
and they inspire, but never appear in the perceived objective world.   
b) All WV is a construction of a collective subject, since it is impossible to a single 
individual, to found, to build, to even express, everything in an imaginary 
system to be related, to think, to hope or to remember. Each group in its social 
life is constructing a precise, specific mentality that not only allows it to comply 
with the objective reality, but that also allows it to dream, to idealize, and to 
escape itself.   
c) WV territory extends at the surface of the objective and at the depths of the 
subjective.   
d) WV serves to live for living daily life, for the anodyne gesture and even to create 
a   system of new connotations.  
e) WV has an image of the world consciously or unconsciously perceived.   
f) Before WV, there arises a series of social and historical manifestations, customs,   
beliefs, ideologies, projects, practices, gestures, etc.     
 
We can distinguish between Generalized Collective Conscience (GCC) and 
Particularized Collective Conscience (PCC). GCC exists in society, time, history, etc., it 
is materially and necessarily in social, artistic, literary, etc. structures.  PCC is the 
materialization and conceptualisation of GCC on the part of a group, class, clan, family, 
etc. Class conscience is, therefore, the taking of conscience on the part of a social group 
of the GCC. Therefore, the conscience of a class or group can be confused, until a 
certain point, with the Particularized Collective Conscience (PCC). It is the Individual 
Conscience (IC), that breaks with the PCC and it materializes in the GCC again. 
Complete autonomy does not exist, but exists when there is a break on the part of an 
individual conscience with a certain materialization of the GCC in PCC, and there is an 
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attempt on the part of consciousness to form a new GCC. We can see the process of 
proceeding of the collective consciences in the following figure (Figure 1):  
 
GCC
PC
GCC'
IC 1
 
Figure 1. 
 
Generalized Collective Conscience (GCC): It exists, it preexists, it is not 
conceptualised. 
Particularised Collective Conscience (PCC): It is materialised by a group, class, clan, 
family, etc.  
Individual Conscience (IC): It belongs to each particular individual.   
 
IC opposes PCC with a new concept of GCC; for that reason, it is in the limit between 
the three-dimensional body of group PCC and the totality GCC. Therefore, an 
ideological exchange is a group rupture and the creation of new Generalised Collective 
Conscience (GCC’).  
 
Note 1: The Generalised Collective Conscience (GCC) only agrees with the Ideological 
Doxical Superstructure (IDS) in the case of monoideological societies.   
 
Primitive or relatively isolated folk societies fulfil the condition specified in Note 1.   
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All these divisions between different consciences try to establish and to construct 
relations, in order to find new explanations to the existence and operation of the 
collective conscience, only subject of the social structure forming the Structural Base 
(SB).  
The individual subject (with his IC) is subject to the very strong influence of 
sociological factors (GCC and PCC), such as the structure of the language, the implicit 
or unconscious systems of social valuation, norms of communication, etc. That is to say, 
subject to the represented collective conscience like symbolic maps of reality. What an 
individual does with these symbolic maps is a phenomenon at the level of the ego, but 
their own symbolic maps correspond to GCC of a society. There exist an immense 
number of symbolic maps comprising the GCC, since it is here where are rooted social 
conventions like the structure and the linguistic syntax of a particular culture, its logic, 
deontic norms, popular ethics, religious vision, family structure, powerful taboos, rules 
of communication, games, and supposed general ideas about reality, etc. All those 
symbolic relations distinguish a particular society and all individuals interiorise them in 
greater or smaller degree by belonging to this society.  Therefore, GCC represents the 
first massive accumulation of symbols in the IC.  
All these deeply rooted symbolic maps fulfil, in essence, the same assignment; to 
advance and to mold the IC with the acceptable and significant conventional forms in 
their society (GCC and PCC). These conceptions mould perceptions, the individual 
learns, in effect, to conform and to translate reality in social terms shared with others. 
This is what it means: "to be a component of a society" (or culture, subculture, group, 
class, clan, family, etc.), since the individual becomes a member of his society (or 
equivalent) after satisfactorily interiorising the maps or sets of symbolic relations (GCC 
and PCC) constituting that society (or equivalent). The individual is included in the 
society when the society includes the individual (Wilber, 1977).  This 
conventionalisation of reality requires individuals to learn to make a socially verifiable 
correspondence one to one between symbol and symbolized thing, world and its 
description. The individual must learn to associate specific objects with the 
conventionally correct words belonging to a certain language L that the society uses to 
represent an object.  
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3. CULTURE 
In according to Borhek and Curtis (1983) culture consists of learned as opposed to 
innate and shared as opposed to truly idiosyncratic ideas, and culturally constructed 
artifacts as opposed to physical artefacts. This definition of culture attributes the 
explanation for sharing of certain beliefs or ideologies to a certain kind of social 
process, that they take place in (SB). The process that accounts for the acquisition of 
culture by individuals is called socialization.  It consists of regular schedules of 
reinforcement. At a simple level, the assertion that beliefs and ideologies are cultural 
rejects a whole range of possible alternative propositions. Culture has the following 
characteristics:  
 
1) Culture implies a peculiar WV.  Culture creates GCC.  
2) Culture is patterned. It consists of related, not discrete elements, which 
are organized according to some general pattern. To move a trait from 
one culture to another is usually to change its function and significance 
through reinterpretation. This involves placing the trait within a novel 
context of meaning. Humans often communicate about WV as if it was a 
separate particle and recognize the need for context only when 
communication fails. The internal consistency of culture often escapes 
notice; it becomes apparent only when it is violated. 
3) Culture provides orientation. Culture is used by humans, individually 
and collectively, as the primary source of solutions to the problems of 
orientation, and may provide solutions to substantive problems, 
according to which problems may be met with traditional and acceptable 
solutions. The existence of one or more orientations is often so implicit 
that the people involved would not ordinarily recognize them without 
being prompted.  
4) Culture changes in response to pressure of events but only very slowly 
because it is to a degree systemic. If culture is systemic, this means that 
all WV’s elements (goals, norms, values, and orientations) are linked 
and that a change in one has strong but subtle implications for change in 
others. As a set of solutions to substantive problems, culture is subject to 
immediate pressures for change. Besides providing in the first place the 
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basic tools for any thought, feeling, judgement, or action, culture 
includes specific deontical norms (prescriptions and proscriptions), sets 
of rules on what to think, feel, and do. When these norms fail to solve 
practical problems, some alternative must be sought at once. Norms and 
values change less rapidly than technology. This is known as culture lag 
(Ogburn, 1950). Commitment to deontical norms and values is stronger 
than commitment to technology, in part because the technology is more 
closely geared to daily necessity.  
5) Culture is differentiated into subcultures which are coextensive with 
networks of communication. Culture is coextensive with a network of 
communication. If societies consisted of homogenous collections of 
individuals, each communicating equally with all the rest, both, culture 
(and its peculiar GCC) and society would be undifferentiated units. 
Then, the conditions of Note 1 would be fulfilled. Since societies are 
differentiated, cultures are too, and along the same lines. That is to say, 
there are multiple PCCs. Then .
1
∪
n
i
iPCCGCC
=
=  Neither societies nor 
the cultures they carry are as simple as a set of discrete building blocks. 
Each member of society participates in a somewhat different set of 
cultural “worlds”, forming a particular IC, each consisting of shared 
meanings and extending as far as system of communication can support 
it (Manis and Meltzer, 1972). None of these cultural worlds (PCC) is the 
exclusive domain of a single human group. However, insofar as the 
boundaries of one kind of world are the same as the boundaries for 
another kind of world, a single group tends to emerge with that unique 
combined culture. That is to say, if we have a human group with PCC1 
and another with PCC2, then ∪
2
1
3
=
=
i
iPCCPCC . To the extent that major 
social cleavages are congruent with a whole list of communicative 
worlds, of course, the possibility of communication across the line of 
cleavages are lessened, subcultural distinctiveness is enhanced, and 
conflicts are likely to be acute. Communicative barriers, consisting, in 
turn, of barriers to social interaction, are cultural barriers. Cultures, as 
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well as societies, are highly differentiated. Each participant in a 
subculture PCCi has a unique perspective based on his unique social 
position, interest, experience and PCC available to him. These members 
do not participate in exactly the same parts of the subculture, that is to 
say .
1
∪
m
j
jICPCC
=
≠  In consequence, the individual member is not 
identical with the subculture, and the believer is not identical with the 
WV. To be sure, the total subculture is carried by the network of 
communication in which the total set of individual members participates 
and may not be said to exist apart from the network of interactions. 
Nevertheless, each individual member’s participation is specialized, and 
most participants devote far less than their full time to the activity, 
whatever it is (Borhek and Curtis, 1983). Applying this to belief systems 
belonging to a determinate WV, the vast majority of believers are in 
rather substantial ignorance of the fine points of most belief systems in 
which they participate. Thus, culture derives a kind of transindividual 
power from its group expression; it does consist of something more and 
greater than is available to any one individual participant (Durkheim, 
1965).  
6) All societies are differentiated. Social differentation is a concomitant of 
institutional differentation which consists of the specialization and 
routinization of activities in general. In relative undifferentiated societies 
(see Note 1), a single social structure is used to organize all collective 
activities that need to be organized: work, religion, war, art, education 
and so on. It implies a peculiar and monolithic GCC. This social 
structure usually assigns positions to individuals based on age, sex, and 
descendance, creating therefore a restricted PCC and IC is confused 
generally with PCC.  The kinship system is the basis for organizing any 
activity. Highly differentiated societies perpetuate certain bodies of 
knowledge and belief through such generalized structures as families, 
public schools, mass media, internet, etc. But in addition they also use 
highly specialized structures, such as professional associations, 
universities, theological schools, laboratories, etc.  As activities develop 
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in specialities, special purpose structures arise to organize them. The 
extent of institutional differentiation is of primary importance as a social 
condition affecting the culture carried by a society (Durkheim, 1947).     
 
4. DENOTATION AND CONNOTATION        
A semiologic theory of the ideologies must incorporate these concepts of an extended 
way, because when we spoke of ideology, in its different meanings, it implies a vision 
of Reality co-divided between many Subjects and limited by the society. Therefore, 
these visions of the world are not like subsystems of a global semantic system, that is to 
say, not segmented realities. In this sense, ideology is to us like an extra-semiotic 
reminder that determines the semiotic events.   
Peirce (1933-1935) when solving the problem of meaning by the mediation of the 
interpretant gave an incomplete explanation, somewhere between an empiricist and a 
metaphysical explanation to the meaning process.  A cultural unit can be a person, 
place, thing, feeling, situation, fantasy, hallucination, idea, hope, custom, etc. It is not 
only individualized by mediation through the flight of interpretings. The cultural unit is 
defined as "place" in a system of other opposed cultural units that circumscribe it. A 
cultural unit subsists and it is recognized in the measure in which “other” exists and 
“other” has a different value. It is the relation between several terms of a system of 
cultural values -what prevails to each one of them has something contributed by others 
(Eco, 1968). Like in a chess game, each piece acquires some value by the position that it 
has with respect to others and each disturbance in the system changes the sense of the 
other correlated pieces.   
 
Definition 2: The semantic field is a structure that formalizes the units of a certain 
culture constituting a portion of the vision of the Reality that owns this culture.   
 
Definition 3: The existence of information is independent of the fact that there is a 
Subject able to decode the message that someone is attempting to communicate. This 
information is termed significant and we denote as ם. 
 
Definition 4: The information in a message acquires meaning if a Subject decodes the 
message. This subjective information is termed significance and we denote as s. 
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Let SB be the conditions of life (Structural Base) (Usó-Domenech and Nescolarde-
Selva, 2012), let s be the units of perceived experience (p-significances), let u be the 
corresponding cultural units and let  ם be the significant forms denoting s, then we have 
the following extrasemiotic problems: 
 
1) SB determines s giving rise to u assigning the name of ם.  
2) SB requires ם to segment the experience in s, that corresponds to u.  
3) A deep semiotic activity leads the human being to think with ם, which not only 
gives rise to u and s, but that in addition requires the human being to prove the 
exigencies of ם. 
 
It is important to be aware that two or more semantic fields can coexist in the same 
culture and that a semantic field may dissolve to give rise to another one. In agreement 
with Eco (1968), we can affirm that:  
 
a) In a certain culture, contradictory semantic fields may exist.   
b) A single cultural unit can comprise of complementary semantic fields. A 
single cultural unit could occupy different positions in different semantic 
fields without incompatible classifications.  For that reason it is 
important to admit that the user of any language has the possibility of 
providing to any objective system (significant), diverse systems of 
significances.   
c) In a single culture, a semantic field may easily be undone and be 
reconstructed in a new field.   
 
Consequence 1: The significance s is a cultural unit, both in categorematical an 
noncategorematical terms.   
 
Consequence 2: Semiotic systems are not synonymous or equivalent and similarly 
systems based on different units cannot describe each other.  Descriptions require the 
same cultural units. A semiotic system can only be described when the elements that 
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comprise it are known. It is impossible to describe a semiotic system using elements 
from a different system. 
 
We may affirm that (Usó-Domenech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012):  
  
1) The significance s is a cultural unit u.  
2) This cultural unit u can be individualized due to the linking of its interpreters, as 
it is pronounced in a concrete culture.   
3) The study of the signs in a culture allows defining the value of the interpretant as 
in a system of positions and oppositions.   
4) It is not possible to formulate a Global Semantic Field, that is to say, the 
formalization of the WV of a culture, because its peripheral interconnections and 
manifestations, changes constantly.   
5) The semantic fields are postulated like useful instruments to explain the 
significant oppositions of a particular group of messages.   
 
Let ם be a significant and s be their significances (Usó-Domenech and Nescolarde-
Selva, 2012). For each significant םi exists a finite number of significances so that םi 
∪
n
i
in ssss
1
21 ...
=
=∪∪∪→ . If ii us ≡  then םi ∪
n
i
iu
1=
= . If during the period [ ]βα tt ,  of a 
culture exist m significant םi that can be interpreted, then 
 
Definition 5: We may define as semantic field Љ ={∪
m
j 1=
םi ∪∪
m
j
n
i
jiu
1 1= =
→ }.  
 
According to Seimas (1970), we define semantic structure as: 
 
Definition 6: By semantic structure we must understand the general form of 
organization of diverse semantic fields of a social and individual nature (culture or 
personalities). 
 
Definition 7: We define denotation as the literal, obvious definition or the common 
sense of the significance of a sign.   
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Denotation may be defined as the elementary modality of significance alleged by the 
referential mode. Let us talk about denotation of an isolated e.g.,  lexeme l. A lexeme, 
like a morphologic unit, is associated with a certain cultural unit u. The definition of 
Shannon (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) considers denotation without appealing to the 
referential mode and can be understood like the invariant in translation processes, that is 
to say, the significance of a significant, what stays as meaning if the significant changes. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to apply this definition to an isolated lexeme. To do this, it 
would be necessary for the semantic fields of different cultures to be isomorphs. 
Therefore, we will have to understand denotation as the immediate reference that a term 
or concept causes in the adressee of the message. Therefore:  
 
Consequence 3:  Denotation is the immediate reference that the code assigns to a term 
or concept in a certain culture.   
 
Consequence 4: The isolated lexeme denotes a position in a semantic system. 
 
In Eco (1968) the notion of denotation is equivalent to ex-tension.  The term or concept, 
besides specifying a class of real objects, denotes a set of cultural units { }iu  occupying 
a particular position within a semantic field Љ, with the exception that the class has 
only a member.  Lexeme denotes the set of all those cultural units in different semantic 
fields, belonging to different cultures, occupying the same position in any semantic 
field.  But this would demand that the semantic fields were isomorphs.   
Let C be a culture and Љ be its semantic field. We denoted as n the respective position 
of a cultural unit u in the semantic field Љ. We suppose as ωCCC ,...,, 21 different 
cultures with their respective semantic fields Љ1, Љ2,…, Љω, Then =l  
Љ1∩Љ2∩…∩  Љω = { } ω,...,2,1=inu .  
When the semantic fields are isomorphs (real condition), the units of a field are 
compared with others by mediation of proofs of commutation (verifying if changing a 
significant changes the contextual significance) or by proofs of substitution (it is 
verified if changing a significant means the significance does not change).  Then: 
 
  
14 
 
Definition 8: The denotatum of a lexeme l is its semantic bond in a determined semantic 
field Љ belonging to a certain culture C.  
 
Lexeme l can assume different positions in diverse and complementary semantic fields 
belonging to C. Let C be a culture and Љ*1, Љ*2,…, Љ*ω .C∈ Then →l  { ∈αl  Љ*1, 
∈βl  Љ*2, ∈ωl.....,  Љ*ω} being ωβα ,...,, different positions.   
 
Consequence 5: The significance s of lexeme l cannot be individualized in any context 
and with the aid of the circumstances of communication.   
 
It is understood that all sequences of the interpretant through which the semiosis process 
revive lexeme l and makes it practicable, rests on the connotation.   
 
Definition 9: Connotation is the sum of all the cultural units that the significant can 
evoke institutionally in the mind of the addressee Subject whose only psychic possibility 
is cultural availability. 
 
In according to Eco (1968) diverse interpretations of connotation exist. We will mention 
those that we considered more important for our intention.   
 
1) Connotation is like definitional meaning: Everything lexeme l connotes the 
properties attributed to the cultural unit denoted by the in-tensional definition 
that commonly is applied. Let us suppose the definition of /stars/. It can be 
ingenuous (famous personage of cinematography) or scientific, given in 
astronomic or astrophysical terms. Since in a same culture both forms of 
definition exist, even other intermediate ones, the possession of one or another 
form constitutes the cultural patrimony of the addressee subject.   
2) Connotation of the semantic units that compose the significance:  Some of these 
semantic components comprise the cultural unit, others do not.  A named 
cultural unit can connote its own syntactic mark.  In a fable or myth, where the 
objects are animated, these connotations have semantic value.   
3) Emotional connotation: In agreement with Stevenson (1944) the emotional 
meaning is a significance in which the reaction or stimulus of the receiving 
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Subject is an emotion. The touching or emotional connotation is an absolutely 
idiosyncratic fact. When one institutionalizes, the emotional connotation stops 
being "Vorstellung" (Frege, 1892), that is to say, a personal image due to the 
preceding experiences influenced by feelings. Then, the preceding socialized 
experiences become elements of the code. In big human groups, these elements 
are associated with a series of emotional connotations justified by a series of 
interpretations of the denotation.  The measure of the meaning (Osgood, Succi 
and Tannebaum, 1957) will be the empirical way to be able to reveal the degree 
of institutionalization of the emotional connotations associated to the semantic 
stimulus.   
4) Ideological definitions:  They are incomplete definitions putting the cultural unit 
on approval or a complex of cultural units under one of their possible aspects.  It 
is the “Sinn” of Frege (1892), or the cultural way in which the object is meant. 
5) Global axiological connotations:  A chain of connotations can assume for the 
adressee subject positive or negative values. These terminal axiological marks 
are the final connotations of the connotations and come bound to the semantics 
of ideologies.  
 
Then and for our purpose: 
 
Definition 10: The connotation of socio-cultural and individual associations, are the 
ideologies derived from the belief systems, and the emotional ones belonging to the 
psychology of the Subject, and that is the indirect function of the Semiotic Environment 
(context) in which is immersed.   
 
A significant ם can connote diverse significances{ }is  (Usó-Domenech and Nescolarde-
Selva, 2012), even sometimes in reciprocal opposition. To know to which of these 
significances connotes the significant ם, in a determined context, is equivalent to say 
that the selection made by the issuer or the adressee is well-known. The selection 
consists of identifying different and complementary positions within different semantic 
fields belonging to a same culture. Due to the system of dual thought the human being 
owns, this selection will take place through oppositions.  
  
16 
 
The significance s tends to be multiplied from an individual sign, until it is equipped 
with many meanings that go beyond what the sign says now. Different orders of 
meaning or levels of significance exist:   
 
1) The first order of significance is exactly the one of the denotation, in whose 
level there a sign t consisting of significant ם and a denotative significance d-s.  
2) The connotation is a significance of second order or c-s that uses the denotative 
sign t (with significant ם and denotative significance d-s) like its significant, 
with an additional associate significance.   
 
This distinction considers the connotation as a sign that is derived from significant ם of 
a denotative sign d-t, so that the denotation takes us to a chain of connotations. 
Denotation is an underlying and primary significance d-s.   
 
Consequence 6:  The significant ם or significance s depends entirely on the level in 
which the analysis operates. Then, what is significance s in one level of the context, can 
be significant ם in another one.  
 
Subject S receives two types of semiotic stimuli:  
 
a) Significants from Subject S´s own process or being.  
b) Significants from the transmitted semiotic stimulus or significant of the 
significance (connotation).   
 
We distinguish two types of significant (Usó-Domenech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012):   
 
Definition 11: The A-significant (A-ם) or first order significant is the significant that  is 
inherent to the beings, processes or phenomena of the referential context.   
 
Definition 12: The B-significant (B- ם), second order significant or connotation is the 
significant of significance s.  
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Connotation B-ם has a veritative value 'v (B- ם) = 1, having simultaneously, a relative 
veritative value or connotative veritative value ( ) [ ]1,0∈sv .  
 
Consequence 7: Changes in the form of the significant ם can generate different 
connotations. 
 
Consequence 8:  All B-significant B-ם including in a context, will be denotative, 
therefore, they will have for the Subject a denotative veritative value equal to 1.   
 
Note 2: A denotative significance d-s is the significance of the absolute beings. 
 
Note 3: The concept of denotative significance d-s agrees with the one of the relative 
beings.  
 
Let ם be a significant.  In a particular semantic field Љ*1 denotes a significance s1 with 
a connotive positionα , it denotes a significance s2 with a connotive position β  in other 
semantic field Љ*2, it denotes a significance s3 with a connotive position βγ  in other 
semantic field Љ*3, and so on.  This means that the significant ם deepens a series of 
ramifications in positions of diverse semantic fields. Let ם1, ם2 , ם3, ם4 be a syntactic 
system of significant unities (Table 1).  
Columns 3, 4 and 5 are semantic systems and sequence ם3, α3s , 
β
3s , 
γ
3s is a chain of 
connotations o connotative chain לּ3.  
 
TABLE 1 
Significants  Љ*1 Љ*2 Љ*3 Connotative 
chain  לּ 
ם1   α1s  
β
1s  
γ
1s   
ם2  α2s  
β
2s  
γ
2s   
ם3 → α3s  
β
3s  
γ
3s  לּ3 
ם4  α4s  
β
4s  
γ
4s   
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When one isolated lexeme is combined with other lexemes we will obtain the following 
ramification (Figure 2):   
 
ם1  
ם2 
ם3 
ם4 
 
α
1s  
α
2s  
α
3s  
 
β
1s  
β
2s  
 
γ
1s  
γ
2s  
γ
3s  
 
δ
1s  
δ
2s  
δ
3s  
 
δ
1s  
δ
2s  
 
ε
1s  
ε
2s  
 
Figure 2. 
 
In this scheme, assuming they form part of the code of a certain cultural community, the 
terminals of each ramification of the significant are considered like their semantic 
components (semantic markers).   
 
Definition 13: The sense σ (Eco, 1968) is a binary selection that the adressee Subject of 
a sentence makes between the diverse ramifications that compose the lexeme.   
 
If the meaning (significance) of lexeme is the set of its denotation and connotations, the 
attributed sense is a selective path constructed by affirmations and negations.   
 
5. SEMIOTIC OF IDEOLOGIES 
The multiplicity of codes and subcodes intersecting in a culture demonstrates that even 
the same message can be decodified from different points of view and appealing to 
diverse systems and conventions.  The message is protected by the fundamental 
denotation of the significant, but different connotations can be attributed to it. In the last 
instance, the extreme possibility exists that the base denotative code is different for the 
issuer and the adressee, and the message can transmit a complete but different sense in 
both cases. This takes us to two fundamental problems:  
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1) Conditions exist that allow decoding in one sense or another. 
2) The message is affected by a certain indetermination that is itself a possible 
source of information.   
 
Some factors orient towards the reading of the preceding phrase.   
 
1) The reference to the Universe of Reasoning (Lyons, 1968).  
2) The reference to an ideology, understood in a coarse way either as a certain 
form acquired by the preceding knowledge of the adressee, or a system of 
prevention and opinions, or a perspective of the universe.  
3) The circumstance of the communication.  If the phrase has been pronounced by 
a priest in the mass-media, their denotative significance and its different 
connotative senses can be individualized clearly. A series of circumstances 
orients the addressees to deduce the ideology of the issuer, and the subcodes to 
which one can make reference.   
For that reason and in agreement with Eco (1968), it is admitted that the sign denotes 
the real objects, that is to say, the perceived objects. 
 
Consequence 9: The circumstance appears as the reality set that blinds and determines 
the selection of codes and subcodes with its own presence.   
 
Therefore, the process of communication, although it does not indicate the referential, 
develops as the referential process.  
 
Definition 14: The circumstance is the complex set of material, economic, social, 
biological, ecological and physical agreements in which human beings communicate. 
 
Let St be a statement (concept or sentence) and let Cr be a circumstance (Usó-
Domenech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012). We suppose { } niSt ,...,1=  the set of all posible 
statements such that { } niStSt ,...,1=∈  and { } mjCr ,...,1= the set of all possible circumstances 
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such that { } mjCrCr ,...,1=∈ . Let { } wk ,...,1=σ be the set of all possible senses of all possible 
statements such that (Table 2) 
 
TABLE 2 
STATEMENT SENSE 
 σ1 σ 2 ……… σ w 
St1 ( )11 ,σSt  ( )21 ,σSt  ……….. ( )wSt σ,1  
St2 ( )12 ,σSt  ( )22 ,σSt  ……….. ( )wSt σ,2  
St
 3 ( )13 ,σSt  ( )23 ,σSt  ………. ( )wSt σ,3  
…….. ……… ………. ……….  
Stn ( )1,σnSt  ( )2,σnSt  ……….. ( )wnSt σ,  
 
That is to say, it will be the Cartesian product{ } { } wkni XSt ,...,1,...,1 == σ . We do not consider 
the improbability of many of these binary relations.  If we introduce the circumstances, 
one will become a table of three dimensions, formed by triplete ( )jki CrSt ,,σ , 
corresponding to the double Cartesian product { } { }( ) { } mjwkni CrXXSt ,...,1,...,1,...,1 === σ .  It 
indicates to us that: 
 
1) In each statement iSt could be anticipated an arbitrary circumstance jCr as to 
attribute to ( )kiSt σ,  an inverosimil sense.   
2) And of the most ambiguous statement can be deduced a circumstance that 
attributes to it the most obvious sense.  
. 
Consequence 10: A statement will have an obvious or inverosimil sense depending on 
the circumstance.   
   
1) The circumstance changes the sense of the message. For example: a red flag 
means danger on a beach, revolutionary ideology in a political manifestation or a 
pirate ship in an historical or adventure movie.   
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2) The circumstance changes the function of the message. For example, the 
signalling of prohibition in a highway has a different emotional sense than in a 
parking lot.   
3) The circumstance changes the degree of information.  For example:  the cross 
has an information degree different in the case of a believer, the sides of an 
ambulance or in a hospitable.   
Nevertheless, the code inevitably takes part in limiting and classifying some 
possibilities and not others. Culture C classifies a series of frequent circumstances in 
which a statement (lexeme or sentences) acquires a possible meaning, that is to say, it 
has a sense. Therefore, it is the culture that takes part like a Recognoscitive Grammar1 
in the semantics of statements, forming rules of circumstantial competence establishing 
that semantic path of connotations that must be followed and which cannot.  
The intersecting intercrossing of circumstances and ideological data budgets, along with 
the multiplicity of codes and subcodes, requires that the message appears as a plastic 
form to which diverse senses can be attributed. Therefore, the information of a message 
(Shannon, 1949) will have to be processed by evaluating the wealth of possible and 
individualizable selections at the level of the message-significant. Information can be 
reduced when the message-significant is related to certain subcodes and it becomes 
message-significance, that is to say, in definitive selection executed by the adressee 
subject. Therefore, we will have two types of different information:  
1) The information from the source: it is physical information, computable 
quantitatively, statistically equiprobable and reducible to the system like a 
correction of probabilístic terms and always open to different possibilities.   
2) The semiotic information: noncomputable quantitatively but can be defined by 
mediation of the series of significances that can be generated from contact with 
the corresponding codes. It is not totally indeterminate, being reduced in a 
definitive way by the interpretation or selection of a concrete message.   
 
 
 
1A generative grammar, as the name implies, builds the syntactically correct sentences of a language. But 
those words may have no meaning. A Recognoscitive Grammar selects phrases that have meaning 
(Y.Villacampa et al. 1999; F. Vives-Macia, 1999). 
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5.1 Message and codes 
The message opened to a multiplicity of codes and subcodes appears as a form that is 
empty of all sense, but from the point of view of the logic of significants, with a very 
precise organization. This organization is the one that orients the decoding and selection 
of the senses, exactly according to the ideology, circumstances or other extrasystemic 
factors. 
We can establish two types of judgements in reference to the existing codes: semiotics 
and factuals (Eco, 1968).   
 
Definition 15:  The semiotic judgment is that in which the predicate is contained 
implicitly in the subject.   
 
Definition 16: The factual judgment is that in which the predicate is added to the 
subject like a new attribute, due to a synthesis that takes place between the empirical 
data and a new form of thought.   
 
A judgement is semiotic in the sense that it constitutes the statement of the intensities 
that a code attributes to a certain cultural unit ui. Therefore a judgement is semiotic 
according to a convention and that when changing the convention, judgements that were 
semiotic turn factual and vice versa (White, 1950).  This is in agreement with diverse 
authors (Austin, 1961; Quine, 1953) 
 
1) A judgement is semiotic when its condition really depends on its significance.   
2) A judgement is factual when its significance depends on a condition really given 
by a comparison with the empirical referential.   
3) A semiotic judgement says what the code anticipates.   
4) A factual judgement says what the code does not anticipate , and therefore 
enriches the code.   
 
A factual judgment only has semiotic importance if it is admitted as true, independently 
of its verification or falsification. In the measure that it is accepted as true, the code 
enriches and it provides new connotations. Therefore a dialectic exist between codes 
and messages, thus the codes govern the issue of messages, but new messages can 
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reconstruct the codes and this is proof of the creativity of the language and the dialectic 
between "creativity governed by rules" versus "creativity changing rules" (Chomsky, 
1962). The factual judgement can be considered as a creativity allowed by rules with a 
code; the syntactic rules allow articulation of messages that enrich the senses of the 
different semantic units. A diachronic dimension is inserted in the synchronous 
dimension of the code as a system of subcodes altering its structure, following its 
dynamic possibilities and their combinatory capacity, as if the code tended to 
reconstruct itself continuously, but at superior level.  
 
5.2. Semiotic system and WV 
A semiotic system like WV is one of the possible ways of giving form to the world, and 
so, it constitutes a partial interpretation of this world, being able to be reviewed 
theoretically whenever new messages, reconstructing the code semantically , introduce 
new connotative chains לּi and for that reason, create new attributions of value.  
An ideology is a conceptualization or materialization of a WV. But conceptualization, 
crystallization, etc., once it has appeared, immobilizes the WV that gave origin it. Any 
ideology is crystallized immediately in a series of behaviors (rules, organized 
associations, cults, discipline, rituals, liturgies, etc.), that necessarily move away from 
the WV that was its origin. According to Ferreras (1980) WV never is crystallized, 
conceptualized; it exists in the society, in its Doxical Superstructure, being able to 
mediate a series of social behaviors and ways to relate, but its existence is only verified 
by its effects. There is not , then, "a presence" of the WV, but "a subjective or interior 
presence" and, of course, diffusely perceived, by the subjects of the same society that 
has generated or produced this certain WV. WVs mediate the deep and nonconscious 
homologíes between the effects (literary works, art, science, deontical rules, etc.) and 
the society. Nevertheless, ideologies not only mediate, but that explains the effects, and 
at the same time as explaining them, they close, in a certain sense, all ways to an 
explanation of these effects. Therefore, ideologies are historical crystallizations of a 
social class, group, and etc. conscience; like something already given and constructed 
(by the associations that carry them). The fact that many ideologies contain a high 
degree of falsification should not make us forget that history considers all types of WV 
as ideological, not that this invalidates the human need for fighting what is right.  
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To define this partial WV, this prospective segmentation of reality, is equivalent to 
define ideology like a false conscience (Marx and Engels, 1976).  Naturally, this "false 
conscience" of the Marxist theory, arises as a theoretical camouflage from concrete 
social relations and certain material conditions of life. In this case, the ideology is a 
message that started off as a description, hypothesis, or a theoretical justification and 
gradually is seen by society like an element of the code. A semiotic theory of ideologies 
is not interested in knowing as it does not conceive the message nor its political or 
economic causes; however, it is interesting to know in what sense the new element of 
the code may be called "ideological".  
 
6. IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION 
We restate here the theory of images and projections presented previously (Usó-
Doménech et al., 2009). We will denote as Σs  the denotative significance 
(dsignificance). We are going to suppose the existence of an only WV or an only 
ideology in the Ideological Doxical Superstructure (IDS).  
 
Definition 17 (Usó-Domènech et al., 2009, Usó-Domenech and Nescolarde-Selva, 
2012): For each d-significance Σs  exists an only one IDS-significance ΣDε  that we will 
denominate as a  doxical superstructural image (IDS-image) of Σs  in IDS. 
However, at the same time the human adressee adds a connotative significance
→
Σ−
Dsc .   
 
Definition 18: Corresponding to each IDS-significance DsΣ  in IDS, will exist an only c-
significance 
→
Σ−
Dsc  to which we will call connotative-SB-projection (CSB-projection) 
of the IDS-significance DsΣ  in the structural base (SB) and that 
→
Σ−
Dsc = for each Σξ and 
for each ( ),, Σ
→
ΣΣΣΣ −∈∈ ξDsciIi iff ( ).ΣΣΣ ∈ ξDC si  
 
Note 4:  Connotative significance 
→
Σ−
Dsc can simply be an only significance or a 
connotative chain לּi of that the receiving subject only perceives its end.  
 
A significant ם denotes significance Σs .  
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Note 5: With the existence of ideologies any message becomes or fixes formulae of 
connotation and blocks any critical process of meta-semiosis.  
 
Nevertheless, it may be the case in that the meta-semiotized message is not possible, 
and that is the hypothesis of Sapir-Whorf (Sapir, 1921 and Whorf, 1956).  
 
Hypothesis of Sapir-Whorf: The syntactic structure of a language L is the particular 
ideological network that imposes on the user a certain WV.  
 
The selection of any code, given by connotations DSc ω

1
−  and DSc ω

2
− can be determined 
by factors of practical order:  the maximum of energy could be good having, even at the 
cost of degradation of the environment, or accepting  insufficient energy before running 
the risk of an ecological catastrophe. This set of valuations constitutes the type of 
ampler recognition, and therefore, a new extra-semiotic remainder. Nevertheless, if it is 
socialized in SB, this remainder is again semiotically organized.  
We are going to consider the SB in times tn and tn+1 like two containers that we will 
denominate β  and α  respectively. System αβ − will be considered as the source of 
information, corresponding to the “phantasmagoric” referential, that is an extra-
semiotical being, the message to communicate that things or events happen in β . 
Semiotics does not have to verify what happens in β , but must control if the messages 
referred to β are grammatically correct. System αβ −  has been a system-code 
transmitting only certain information ; it is playing the role of filter, a polarizing lens or 
Maxwell´s demon. We have then the concept of doxical filter that we have previously 
presented. What represents the doxical filter in system αβ −  understood as a system-
code?  It represents the ideology, which in this case has the structure of the code (Eco, 
1968).   
In system αβ − two phenomena happen:    
1) There exist units of significance imposed as pertinent by acquired experience.   
2) There exists a syntactic structure of the code, which comes conditioned by the 
pertinent elements of the semantic system.   
In Eco (1968), there are two possible answers for the structuration of the code:   
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1) Only certain semantic units and not others are accepted as pertinent, and a code 
with certain syntactic structures prevails, and for that reason culture has 
determined the structure of the code.  
2) Syntactic structure of the code proceeds to the individualization of the pertinent 
elements of meaning; then, the semantic system does not generate the syntactic 
structure of the code, but that happens inversely. Then, the WV is considered in 
terms imposed by the system of generative rules of the code. In this case, 
language L determines culture and not culture determines language. That is to 
say, the hypothesis of Sapir-Whorf prevails.  
 
We think that both phenomena happen. Although language L determines culture 
(second option), the acquired experience accepts answers and not others, somehow 
modifying the syntactic structure of the code (first option).  
A certain way to use a language L is identified with certain way to think a society, with 
its WV. Therefore, we may say:   
 
Definition 19: The semiotical ideology is the final connotation of the chain of 
connotations לּ, or like the connotation of all the connotations of a lexeme.   
 
7. AN ECOLOGICAL CASE 
Let us suppose that the significance represents “ם = energy consumption" (Usó-
Domenech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012).  We will name α  the signal "minimum of 
energy" and ω  the signal "maximum of energy".  Each one of these two signals would 
correspond to two denotative significances ωα DD ss , that would correspond to two 
images ωα εε , in IDS. The connotative projection of αε can suppose “ DSc α

− = minimum 
well-being" and the one ofω , " DSc ω

− = maximum well-being". Why does a certain 
adressee chooses a connotation and not another alternative? Experience has taught  him 
what α  may be hoped from the denoted situation and the patrimony of knowledge has 
become stabilized. This cultural patrimony represents a extra-semiotical remainder until 
it becomes occasional or idiosyncratic, not communicating with anybody. However, 
without experience of being socialized, the cultural data happens to be an element of a 
  
27 
 
semantic system, with a connotative subcode that establishes an imprisonment of pre-
fixed references, mediated by denotation, so arriving at the connotation "suitable 
energy". The mechanism we can see in figure 3.   
 
Ideological Doxical 
Superstructure 
 (IDS) 
Values in fact, Dominant Ideology, 
Primigenial Base (PB) 
 
Ideal Values, Myths.
connotative-SB- projection 
(materialization)
Subject
mythical superstructural 
image (MS-image)
Ideal Structure (ISt) 
  
Ideal Values, Utopia (Goals)
doxical superstructural 
denotative image (IDS-image). 
denotative-MS-projectio
Mythical Superstructure (MS)
Structural 
Base
[t0 ,tn ] Structural 
Base
[tn,t m]
Figure 3.   
 
Now let us suppose the case of two ideologies in IDS. We suppose the existence, in SB 
of two human groups, believing respectively in each one of the two ideologies (figure 
4).   
 Nevertheless, signal ω may denote, according to the adressee "well-being" or "danger" 
(degradation of environment), being based on two equally legitimate codes. We have 
before a series of semantic systems at the secondary level that oppose values of the type 
“desirable versus danger". Each unit of these semantic systems " DSc ω

1
− = maximum 
well-being" and " DSc ω

2
− = danger" becomes the connotative significance of the 
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significant “ם = energy consumption" represented by the denotative significance ωε of 
the semantic system in the first level.  
 
IDEOLOGY 1 IDEOLOGY 2
HUMAN GROUP 1
1
HUMAN GROUP2 
HUMAN GROUP2 HUMAN GROUP 1
STRUCTURAL BASE
tn tn+1
denotative IDS-image
connotative SB-projection1 connotative SB-projection2
significant (message)
β α
 
Figure 4. 
 
Thus there may exist for a human group 1 a connotative code for DSc ω

1
−  that establishes 
/maximum energy/ = "maximum productivity" and an other that establishes /maximum 
energy/ = "maximum well-being society" and finally a subcode that establishes 
/maximum well-being of the society/ = "justification of  any cost".  And there may exist 
for human group 2 another connotative code for DSc ω

2
−  that establishes /respect for  
environment / = "elimination of all cost of unnecessary energy". These systems of 
values are semantic systems that sometimes are excluded mutually. When this is not the 
case, they can be included in a more complete code than  offers transformation rules to 
translate the more restricted systems in terms of a more complete system. Now we 
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suppose that somebody, belonging to human group 1, identifying message α with the 
connotation "well-being", uses it always in this way. Then, α  becomes a symbol, it is 
the emblem of "well-being". The fixed connection between the significant “ם = energy 
consumption" and Idea of Well-being acts metaphorically. Then we were before a 
rhetorical artifice or rhetorical figure. We do not consider the case that somebody, with 
a nonconfesable interest, issues message α  when the situation denoted habitually by 
α does not take place in SB. In this case, we would have a falsification.  In this 
falsification case, still it is not possible to speak of ideological use of a language L, with 
the meaning of ideology as a false conscience and camouflage (Eco, 1968). When 
message α becomes a rhetorical figure connoting "well-being” automatically, 
conscientious or unconsciously, the believers of human group 1 reject the possibility of 
applying the message, possibly with the connotation of "danger". Due to an ampler 
semiotical system, second connotation DSc ω

2
−  is equally foreseeable, but the use of the 
first connotation DSc ω

1
− , optimistic type, is imposed or induced, it gives to the message 
a fixed ideological function.  The message has become an ideological instrument hiding 
the other relations. Then the ideology takes the function of a false conscience from the 
Marxist perspective. According to Eco (1968), from the semiotic point of view a 
message α exists that has happened to be a significant unit of a rhetorical subcode. This 
significant “ם = energy consumption” connotes a significance DSc ω

1
−  or a significance 
DSc ω

2
− , like a semantic unit of an ideological code. In this case, the message hides 
(instead of communicating) the material conditions that it had to express. In addition, 
this is because it has assumed falsifying functions by hiding the different semantic 
systems in the totality from its mutual relations.  
In our system αβ − two phenomena happen:   
a) The units of significance = minimum of energy; maximum of energy are 
imposed as pertinent by the acquired experience.   
b) The syntactic structure of the code is conditioned by the pertinent 
elements of the semantic system.   
 
8. REFLECTIONS 
A semiotic theory of systems derived from language would have the purpose of 
classifying all the systems of linguistic expression:  philosophy, ideology, myth, poetry, 
  
30 
 
art, as much as the dream, lapsus, and free association in a pluridimensional matrix 
where will be interfered many diversified fields . In each one of these discourses it is 
necessary, in effect, to consider a plurality of questions, that are systemically inter-
related. It  will be necessary to ask about, in the first place, what will be the purpose of 
this language, what function does it fulfil, and for what reason has it been constructed.   
All solutions to the problem of Doxical Superstructure (DS) depends on language’s 
constitution, because this will allow us to differentiate the diverse discourses that man, 
as subject and actor, maintains based on exhaustive criteria defining, in part, each type 
of language, and in another part, isolating the "places" where it makes contact with 
other spheres of reality.  
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